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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that “every new invention, every new 
want which it occasioned, and every new desire which craved satisfaction 
were steps toward a general leveling [of society].”2  The changes wrought 
by the growth of Internet use reaffirm the truth of the statement.  The 
Internet has created new opportunities for communication and expanded 
the reach of speakers more than any medium yet conceived.   
 
“Unlike thirty years ago, when ‘many citizens [were] 
barred from meaningful participation in public discourse by 
financial or status inequalities, and a relatively small 
number of powerful speakers [could] dominate the 
marketplace of ideas,[,]’3 the internet now allows anyone 
                                                 
1
 D. Wes Sullenger is a former law professor who is now a partner with the Sullenger 
Law Office in Kentucky.  The author wishes to thank his former student Tony Lee for 
providing a sounding board and editorial assistance on this article.  The author also 
wishes to thank Craig Agule, Esq. his insightful comments on the concept that became 
this article. 
2
 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 4 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner, eds., 
George Lawrence, trans., 1999). 
3
 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005) (quoting Lyrissa Barnet Lidsky, Silencing 
John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 894 (2000)). 
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with a phone line to ‘become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’”4 
 
[2] This vast expansion in communication capabilities has wrought 
notable changes in society.  As one might expect, the Internet has changed 
the way people receive news5 and make decisions.6  The Internet’s growth 
into a mainstream medium7 has even effected a change in the 
government’s interaction with citizens as well as the way politicians 
campaign.8 
 
[3] The Internet promises to “enhance an ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open’ debate on public issues by improving our ability to become 
informed about public issues and to discuss those issues actively.”9  The 
ever-increasing number of Internet users in America10 has led some 
academics to assert that citizens will directly affect policy by voicing their 
concerns to legislators directly, via the Internet, when they believe action 
should be taken.11  The recent development of “blogs” has made this 
prediction increasingly viable.12  Through the use of blogs, speakers can 
                                                 
4
 Doe, 884 A.2d at 455 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 896-97 (1997)).  One 
should note that the Doe court cites to the wrong pages of the Reno opinion.  The quoted 
portion is actually located at 521 U.S. at 870. 
5
 See The Pew Research Center For the People and the Press, News Audiences 
Increasingly Politicized: Online News Audience Larger, More Diverse, http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=834 (last visited June 7, 2007) (noting the 
number of people who receive news from traditional sources has declined while the 
number of people receiving their news from the Internet increased from two percent in 
1995 to twenty-nine percent by 2004). 
6
  See Burst: Online Ads Make Impression; Internet Primary Source for Purchase Info, 
http://marketingvox.com/archives/2006/04/20/burst_online_ads_make_impression_intern
et_primary_source_for_purchase_info/ 
(last visited June 1, 2006) (explaining that over fifty-seven percent of Internet users say 
the Internet is their primary source of information about products and services they buy). 
7
 See infra Part II.C.2.b. 
8
 See also infra Part II.C.3.  
9
 David J. Goldstone, The Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information 
Superhighway (Where Are the Public Forums on the Information Superhighway?), 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 335, 341 (1995) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270 (1964)). 
10
 See infra Part C.3. 
11
 LAWRENCE GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC 149 (1995). 
12
 See infra Part II.C.3.  
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address Internet users half-way around the world or narrow the reach of 
their speech down to an individual conversation with another Internet user 
on the same street.13 
 
[4] This article considers the First Amendment implications of employing 
this technological growth in the political arena.  Analyzing the initial 
experiments with direct democracy in colonial America provides a 
framework to explain the effect the Internet could have on the democratic 
system.14  Direct democracy started with the town meeting style of 
government in New England.  A brief examination of the Founders’ 
reaction to that system, however, shows they created a representative 
democracy as a buffer to direct citizen control.15  This article will then 
consider the modern calls for direct democracy,16 including a discussion of 
the nature of direct democracy17 and modern experiments in direct 
democracy.18 This article also analyzes the societal changes forged by the 
Internet, as well as the belief by some that these changes justify a 
contemporary transformation to a direct democracy.19  Lastly, the 
evolution of the political system, in an effort to adapt to the development 
of the Internet, must be evaluated in order to complete the roadmap for the 
discussion.20  This examination includes a discussion of the contemporary 
formation of blogs and the effect of their invasion into America’s 
democratic system.21 
 
[5] The substantive constitutional discussion is based on a hypothetical.  
This article assumes a hypothetical member of Congress, seeing the power 
of the Internet to connect with constituents, chooses to maintain a blog on 
his or her official website.  The legislator uses the blog to post topics of 
current political interest and to solicit opinions from constituents on the 
position the legislator should take on the issues.  While this arrangement 
likely would have some political benefits in terms of making constituents 
                                                 
13
 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (2005). 
14
 See infra Part II.A.  
15
 See infra Part II.A-B.  
16
 See infra Part II.C.  
17
 See infra Part II.C.1. 
18
 See infra Part II.C.  
19
 See infra Part II.C.2.b.  
20
 See infra Part II.C.3.  
21
 See infra Part II.C.3.a.i.  
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feel empowered and important, it would also raise concerns from the 
legislator’s perspective.  The legislator, for example, would be concerned 
that some constituents would post statements that other constituents would 
find degrading, offensive, or profane.  To combat the potential harm to the 
legislator’s reputation from such statements, the legislator might want to 
take precautions, such as screening messages, altering some content, or 
removing certain messages. 
 
[6] This article considers the constitutionality of these possible reactions 
from the legislator.  The article applies a traditional First Amendment 
analysis to the issue.22  After defining the contours of the modern public 
forum doctrine,23 the article considers the status of blogs, concluding the 
public forum doctrine should apply to them.24  Finally, the article 
discusses why the application of the public forum doctrine to blogs should 
be problematic to legislators.  This discussion demonstrates that the 
hypothetical legislator’s blog should be classified as a limited public 
forum in which the remedies the legislator seeks to use to control the blog 
will be deemed unconstitutional.25 
 
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: FROM TOWN MEETING TO THE 
INTERNET 
 
[7] America’s government has undergone dramatic changes.  During the 
colonial period in America, colonists in various locales in the New 
England colonies governed themselves through town meetings.  The 
massive shift, of course, came after independence when the Framers of the 
Constitution adopted a representative form of government.  As technology 
has changed society, though, some people have begun calling for a return 
to direct democracy.  This section explores the contours of the debate. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 See infra Part III. 
23
 See infra Part III.A. 
24
 See infra Part III.B.1. 
25
 See infra Part III.B.2.-3. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 4 
 
5 
A. COLONIAL TOWN MEETING GOVERNMENTS 
 
[8] Colonial American society, particularly in New England, was based on 
townships.26 As such, government was addressed at the town level through 
town meetings.27  The town meeting system provided a political life that 
was both truly democratic and republican.28   
 
[9] Town meetings were assemblies of a town’s residents for purposes of 
settling matters of common concern.29  While each town meeting differed 
somewhat in form, the general equality of condition among the people in 
the townships let every resident influence the laws.30  The residents 
discussed and deliberated public matters at these assemblies.31  Through 
the meetings, the residents enacted local ordinances32 and handled other 
matters such as watching over any Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Scots, blacks, 
or transients in the town and providing for the local livestock.33   
 
[10] Eligibility to participate in town meetings varied, however.  In 
Massachusetts, one had to be a member of the Puritan church and granted 
citizenship by a vote of the town in order to vote in the meeting.34  Other 
residents could attend and speak but could not vote.35  Other colonies had 
similar requirements.36 
 
[11] The town meeting system worked well in providing a voice to those 
impacted by the decisions of the governing bodies.  Still, towns needed 
                                                 
26
 See WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION: 1660-1713, 17 (1968); 
see also DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 57-58. 
27
 OSCAR THEODORE BARCK, JR. & HUGH TALMAGE LEFLER, COLONIAL AMERICA, 80 
(1958); see also CRAVEN, supra note 26, at 24. 
28
 See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 56. 
29
 CRAVEN, supra note 26, at 24. 
30
 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 2, at 3. 
31
 See id. 
32
 See BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 80. 
33
 2 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 178 (1964). 
34
 BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 94-95. 
35
 Id. at 95. 
36
 In New Haven, for example, voting was limited to those who were church members, 
had been admitted by the general court as “free burgesses,” and had taken a “freeman’s 
charge.”  See ANDREWS, supra note 33, at 165. 
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individuals who could administer town affairs between meetings.37  To 
provide for consistent governance, residents elected a group of 
“selectmen” at an annual town meeting.  The selectmen were the officers 
who oversaw local matters between meetings.38  These officials included 
the town clerk, constable, and other officers found necessary.39 
 
[12] In addition to performing their role as administrators of the township, 
selectmen also played a role in the colonial government.  The town 
selectmen met with the royal governor and his assistants to lobby for the 
political desires of the colonists.40  Thus, “the town meeting was the 
sounding board of public opinion on all important local, and sometimes 
colonial, problems.”41   
 
[13] This system of government worked well in the New England 
colonies.  After independence, though, the Framers removed the direct 
democracy component from American governance.  As we will see, 
though, the People never lost their yearning for a direct say in government. 
 
B. THE FRAMERS REJECT DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
 
[14] Their experience being governed from overseas left the Founding 
generation distrustful of centralized power because of its detachment from 
those affected by legislators’ actions.42  Representatives to a large central 
government could not know most of their constituents.43  Had they been 
given representation in Parliament, the colonists feared their 
representatives would “easily lose a sense of connection with their 
constituents when living in a grand imperial city an ocean away, rubbing 
                                                 
37
 In some colonies, town meetings occurred no more than once each year.  See CRAVEN, 
supra note 26, at 24. 
38
 Id.; see also BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 80 (describing how in Plymouth 
colony, residents elected local officials at town meetings).  In Massachusetts Bay, 
residents elected seven “select men” who administered town matters.  Id. at 95. 
39
 See CRAVEN, supra note 26, at 24; see also BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 95 
(explaining that in Massachusetts, selectmen also elected additional officials not chosen 
by the residents). 
40
 See CRAVEN, supra note 26, at 25-26; see also BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 90. 
41
 See BARCK & LEFLER, supra note 27, at 262. 
42
 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 40 (2005). 
43
 Id. 
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elbows with English aristocrats and haughty diplomats.”44  Thus, after 
independence, the Founders set out to create a reliable and stable but 
decentralized system of government. 
 
[15] Although they were revolutionaries, the Founders distrusted 
democracy.45  They feared common people with true power would give 
political control to ambitious politicians rather than the elites capable of 
putting the public interest above factional desires.46  The Founders 
minimized this possibility by virtually removing from the People the 
ability to vote directly on important matters.47  To ensure all citizens could 
look after their own interests, however, the Founders separated the 
national government from state and local governments.  Citizens 
participated directly in the latter through their influence over the 
politicians and political bodies that resided close to them.48 
 
[16] The extent to which the People should be involved in political 
decisions, however, divided even the Framers.  Not long after the 
founding, ideological parties began forming.49  These parties arose in 
response, among other things, to differing views on the role of the 
common people.  James Madison defended the rise of political parties in 
1792.  He described Federalists, without using the term, as “more partial 
to the opulent than to the other classes of society” and, therefore, 
“wish[ing] to point the measures of government less to the interest of the 
                                                 
44
 Id. 
45
 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:  JEFFERSON, 
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 16 (2005). 
46
 See id. at 18. 
47
 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson 
ed., 1888) (arguing that election of senators by state legislatures instead of citizens would 
result in senators 
less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of 
the reach of those occasional ill humors, or temporary 
prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, 
frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice 
and oppression of a part of the community, and engender 
schemes, which, though they gratify a momentary 
inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, 
dissatisfaction, and disgust.). 
48
 See AMAR, supra note 42, at 184-85. 
49
 See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 19-26 (detailing development of Federalist 
and Republican parties). 
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many than of a few.”50  On the other side, Madison said without referring 
to the Republicans by name, were  
 
those who believing in the doctrine that mankind are 
capable of governing themselves, and hating hereditary 
power as an insult to the reason and outrage to the rights of 
man, are naturally offended at every public measure that 
does not appeal to the understanding and to the general 
interest of the community.51 
 
[17] Nevertheless, despite this criticism, in the 1790s, Madison joined 
with Thomas Jefferson’s Republican faction opposed to the Federalist 
agenda.52  Jefferson and Madison believed the Federalists had taken the 
government from the American people.53  Jefferson felt the Federalists, 
though duly elected, were betraying the spirit of the Revolution by 
expanding the federal government, aligning the nation more with England 
than France, passing the Alien and Sedition Acts limiting speech, and 
creating a new army.54  Like the Federalists, Jefferson feared the 
concentration of political power.  He viewed the concentration of power 
into a single body as the cause of the destruction of “liberty and the rights 
of man in every government which has ever existed under the sun.”55  For 
Jefferson, however, this distrust of centralized power meant ultimate 
power should be diffused into smaller governments. 
 
[18] Jefferson believed the citizens of each state had a natural right to 
control their own domestic affairs.56  However, his states’ rights 
perspective extended beyond merely those domestic matters.  Jefferson 
                                                 
50
 14 JAMES MADISON, A Candid State of the Parties, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
370, 371 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 45, at 25 
(quoting same and discussing Madison “demonizing his opponents as covert 
monarchists”). 
51
 MADISON, supra note 50, at 371. 
52
 See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS:  THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 52-55 
(2001) (describing Madison’s Federalist push for the Constitution in the 1780s and his 
conversion in the 1790s to Jefferson’s Republican party). 
53
 Id. at 198. 
54
 Id. at 140, 198-99. 
55
 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), in XIV WRITINGS 417, 
421 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903). 
56
 See ELLIS, supra note 52, at 199. 
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drafted a version of what became the Kentucky Resolution that allowed 
states to nullify any law not arising under federal jurisdiction set out in the 
Constitution.57  Jefferson’s draft further allowed states to secede if 
Congress or the federal courts did not adhere to their rejection of the 
federal law.58 
 
[19] The Kentucky legislature did not adopt the portions of the Resolution 
permitting secession.  Madison, always the shrewder political thinker in 
the collaboration with Jefferson,59 contemporaneously proposed the 
moderate Virginia Resolution, which rejected Jefferson’s “compact” 
theory of the Union in favor of judicial review with protections for free 
speech and press.60  Although Jefferson disagreed with Madison’s 
rejection of nullification and secession, he softened his position to 
maintain unity with his chief collaborator against the Federalists.61 
 
[20] Jefferson’s preference for small governments was significant.  His 
fear of concentrated power also extended to the People.  Thus, he 
criticized the town meeting style of government used in parts of New 
England.  Jefferson commented that expansion of that form to other parts 
of the Union would permit “the drunken loungers at and about the court 
houses” to control political affairs.62  Yet, the People, Jefferson wrote, had 
to play an active role in their government.63  He felt citizen involvement 
was important to the decentralization of power.  Accordingly, Jefferson 
proposed concentric levels of government, each drawing from the lower 
levels.  He suggested a national government limited to defending the 
nation and conducting foreign and interstate relations.  State governments 
would be responsible for civil rights, policing, and administering day-to-
day matters of concern to their citizens.  County governments would 
attend to local concerns.64  Each layer of government would be responsible 
                                                 
57
 Id. at 199-200. 
58
 Id. at 200. 
59
 Id. at 53-54. 
60
 Id. at 200. 
61
 Id. at 200-01.  Jefferson also, after presenting the idea to Madison, abandoned his 
belief that each generation is sovereign and, therefore, laws should expire after 
approximately twenty years.  Id. at 54-55. 
62
 JEFFERSON, supra note 55, at 423. 
63
 See id. at 422. 
64
 Id. at 421. 
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for its immediate concerns and would delegate responsibilities for which it 
was not competent to a different level.65 
 
[21] To this basic governmental structure, however, Jefferson counseled a 
system in which the People would directly impact the government by 
controlling it at the lowest, most diffuse level.  Thus, he called for 
“divid[ing] the counties into wards.”66  Jefferson saw the wards as small 
political debating assemblies.  These groups would allow each citizen to 
educate himself in political matters and “be a sharer in the direction of his 
ward-republic . . . [as] a participator in the government of affairs, not 
merely at an election one day in the year, but every day.”67  Jefferson 
viewed such direct citizen input as essential to the functioning of the 
republic, in which the true power comes from the People, and as a 
measure for enhancing citizenship.68  Jefferson believed the citizen-
controlled wards would commingle with the republican governments at 
the county, state, and national levels to form “a gradition [sic] of 
authorities, standing each on the basis of law, holding every one of its 
delegated share of powers, and constituting truly a system of fundamental 
balances and checks for the government.”69 
 
[22] Jefferson, of course, never succeeded in adding citizen wards to 
American government. The idea, though, proved hard to shake.  The 
Progressive Movement of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
attempted to make Jefferson’s ward system a reality.70  Progressive 
activists and political scientists organized public deliberative bodies.71  In 
Cleveland, for example, Mayor Tom Johnson held large picnics at which 
citizens discussed political matters with the leadership.72  These picnics, 
however, led to no large-scale reforms, because Johnson often acted 
adversely to public opinion.73   
                                                 
65
 Id. at 422. 
66
 Id. at 419-20. 
67
 Id. at 422. 
68
 ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA:  A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR 
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 47-48 (2004). 
69
 JEFFERSON, supra note 55, at 422. 
70
 See LEIB, supra note 68, at 51-52. 
71
 Id. at 52-56. 
72
 Id. at 53-54. 
73
 Id. at 54. 
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[23] Social debate clubs also opened in, among other places, Rochester, 
New York.  These clubs allowed all people – even women and immigrants 
– to debate politics with professors and other attendees.74  These clubs, 
however, were more concerned with helping people become articulate 
political debaters than with exerting real political influence, which they 
lacked because they were only voluntary organizations which few, if any, 
politicians chose to attend.75 
 
[24] The Progressives’ experiments with direct democracy along the 
Jeffersonian model failed to make any meaningful change in our political 
system.  They abandoned their efforts to allow citizens to debate on public 
issues.  The People, however, never lost their hunger for direct democracy. 
 
C. CALLS FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
 
1. THE NATURE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
 
[25] Americans have actively practiced “direct democracy” for more than 
100 years.76  Today, seventy percent of the United States population lives 
in a state or city where direct democracy is available.77  As such, a basic 
understanding of direct democracy in its modern form, as opposed to the 
colonial and Jeffersonian forms, is important in order to understand the 
potential changes available due to the Internet. 
 
[26] Direct democracy is a broad label encompassing such decision-
making processes as town meetings, recall elections, initiatives, and 
referenda.78  The most important and most common forms of direct 
democracy in the United States are the initiative and referendum.79  Most 
                                                 
74
 Id. at 55. 
75
 Id. at 56. 
76
 Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy:  New Approaches to Old 
Questions, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 463, 463 (2004). 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at 465. 
79
 Id.  The initiative and the referendum are both devices that allow the voters to engage 
in legislative action without the approval or involvement of their elected officials.  The 
devices, however, work in different ways.  Through an initiative, voters can propose new 
legislation.  The referendum, in contrast, allows voters to repeal laws already enacted.  
See also Jahr v. Casebeer, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing 
differences between initiatives and referenda).   
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Americans favor direct democracy.  Studies show people living in direct 
democracy markets are happier and more likely to vote, give money to 
interest groups, and generally pay more attention to the media and other 
sources to enhance their political knowledge.80 
 
[27] Nevertheless, direct democracy is controversial.  Like in colonial 
times, many journalists and political elites are suspicious of direct 
decision-making by citizens.81  These skeptics fear voters are incompetent 
to make policy decisions.  Further, they argue the process is too subject to 
manipulation by special interests and moneyed parties or persons.82  
Additionally, many critics claim citizens are incompetent to make political 
decisions due to the limited facts they have on which to base their 
decisions.83   
 
[28] These weaknesses, however, give voters an incentive to seek 
guidance from more informed, credible sources.84  A legislator’s blog 
would be ideal.  Voters could inform themselves about the issues and 
related arguments from materials posted on the blog or located elsewhere 
on the Internet.  Then, without the need to change to a direct democracy 
system of government, the People could directly impact the political 
process by communicating their desires to their legislator(s). 
 
2. THE INTERNET LEADS TO CALLS FOR TOTAL DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
 
[29] The high cost of publishing in traditional print and broadcast media 
limits the number of voices that can be heard.85 Technology, however, has 
led increasingly to the obsolescence of those outlets as the sole arbiters of 
the information essential to democracy.86  The change has come because, 
contrary to the closed ranks of newspaper publishers, the World Wide 
                                                 
80
 Lupia & Matsusaka, supra note 76 at 475 (citing studies). 
81
 Id. at 464. 
82
 Id.  These concerns are bolstered by studies demonstrating that strong investments of 
money can defeat referenda.  Id. at 470-71. 
83
 Id. at 467. 
84
 Id. at 469. 
85
 Joelle Tessler, Web Pundits May Find It’s Not So Free Speech, CQ WEEKLY, Aug. 6, 
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13638278. 
86
 Charles Krauthammer, Ross Perot and the Call-in Presidency, TIME, July 13, 1992, at 
84. 
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Web87 is open as a publication forum for anyone with an Internet 
connection.88  Thus, “the Internet has brought democracy to your doorstep 
and to your desktop.”89  This expansion in the reach of the voices of 
average citizens has led to calls from some quarters for changes in how we 
conduct our democracy.  Pushing the Jeffersonian theme even further, 
these advocates seek various forms of direct democracy. 
 
[30] By now, it is well known that “[t]he Internet is an international 
network of interconnected computers.”90  The network allows millions of 
people to communicate with each other and to access vast caches of 
information from around the world.91  This “unique and wholly new 
medium of worldwide communication”92 is “the most participatory form 
of mass speech yet developed.”93  Because individuals, by using web 
pages, can become pamphleteers,94 “the content on the Internet is as 
diverse as human thought.”95 
 
[31] The Internet has been described as allowing measurements of public 
opinion, providing a public forum, and facilitating citizen access to 
government.96  Because of these varied functions, some scholars argue 
computers and communications technology spawned a “third industrial 
                                                 
87
 When people speak of the Internet, they generally are referring to the World Wide 
Web.  “The Web” is the part of the Internet on which people use Internet browsers to 
view information, pictures, movies, etc.  See JOHN LEVINE ET AL., THE INTERNET FOR 
DUMMIES 11 (2005).  However, the Internet offers several other methods for viewing or 
exchanging information.  Electronic mail (“e-mail”) is the most used feature of the 
Internet.  Users can also “chat” with other users by entering online chat rooms or 
exchange instant messages with other users through special software.  Id. at 261.  
Thousands of “newsgroups” are also available where users can post their thoughts and 
read other users’ thoughts on topics of interest.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-
51 (1997). 
88
 Tessler, supra note 85. 
89
 Id. (quoting online advertising executive Michael Bassik). 
90
 Reno, 521 U.S. at 849. 
91
 Id. at 850. 
92
 Id. 
93
 Id. at 863. 
94
 Id. at 870. 
95
 Id. (citation omitted). 
96
 RICHARD DAVIS, THE WEB OF POLITICS:  THE INTERNET’S IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 20-21 (1999). 
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revolution.”97  Like the steam power of the first industrial revolution and 
the electricity and internal combustion engine of the second industrial 
revolution, these scholars believe the technology revolution should forge 
changes in government.98   
 
[32] Comparing the Internet to the printing presses that fueled the 
revolutionary spirit in the eighteenth century, one writer has proclaimed:  
“[T]he founding fathers would have loved the Internet.”99  Because 
citizens are the best judges of what is in their best interests, some argue, 
they should be allowed to debate and vote directly on important issues.100  
Allowing direct participation in government, these critics assert, will 
include in policy deliberation the most highly educated and informed 
citizens – those who, unlike in the eighteenth century, now generally 
reside in business, universities, or the media rather than in Congress.101 
 
[33] Even further, some commentators argue citizens have become so 
remote from the decision makers that decisions, though made in their 
name, cannot be attributed to them.102    Thus, one writer has argued we 
must create a fourth branch of government – the Popular Branch – using 
“civil juries” to make laws.103  More mainstream arguments, however, 
simply call for direct democracy by electronic town hall meetings.104 
 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BAR TO A DIRECT DEMOCRACY SYSTEM 
 
[34] Any proposal for a shift to direct democracy faces a major 
constitutional impediment.  While the Framers might in fact have loved 
the Internet as a tool for communications and advocacy, one must doubt 
that its existence would have changed their minds about the desirability of 
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direct citizen involvement in law making.  The Framers drafted the 
Constitution to ensure the perpetuation of the balance they struck in which 
citizens were involved with some parts of their government but were 
removed from its lawmaking aspect. 
 
[35] Article IV § 4 of the Constitution requires that “the United States 
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government.”  Consistent with this, Article V requires action by Congress 
or by two-thirds of the state legislatures to propose constitutional 
amendments and ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures or 
conventions.  The Framers made no provision for direct control by 
citizens. 
 
[36] Nevertheless, Professor Akhil Reed Amar claims we must “unlearn[]” 
the purportedly incorrect lesson that the Founders opposed direct 
democracy.105  Professor Amar has argued that, because the People are 
sovereign, a majority of the People can always exert their sovereign 
control over government.  Thus, Amar has argued that the People can 
amend the Constitution or presumably enact any legislation they desire 
simply by majority vote.106 
 
[37] The historical record, however, rejects the argument.107  Nothing in 
the language of the Constitution permits direct action by the People either 
in legislating or amending the Constitution.108  While “the People” are 
involved in the operation of government as voters and through the jury 
system, the Constitution does not provide for direct participation by the 
People in ordinary lawmaking.109  Thus, Professor Amar gives the 
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Constitution a “democratic quality” the Framers did not intend for it in 
order to avoid the fact that “the Constitution was designed to prevent all 
unmediated lawmaking by the people.”110  Professor Amar’s view simply 
“cannot be reconciled with the founding generation’s abiding fear of the 
excesses of democracy.”111   
 
[38] The historical record amply demonstrates the Founders’ fears of the 
passions of the People.  The Framers viewed direct citizen participation in 
lawmaking as the biggest threat to stable government.112  Indeed, the 
Founders likely would have been horrified even by the now accepted 
initiative and referendum process.113  Madison and the Federalists he was 
then aiding defeated a proposal to add to the First Amendment a right for 
the People to “instruct their representatives.”114  They feared disastrous 
consequences if lawmakers felt bound to follow the whims of their 
constituents.115  The Founders avoided those consequences by drafting a 
Constitution that kept the People out of lawmaking and preserved the 
structure of government.116 
 
[39] This distrust of the masses was not merely classism.  To the contrary, 
the Founders’ experience with the colonial form of direct democracy led 
them to control majoritarian tendencies.  Madison lamented that colonial 
governments had too often allowed majorities to ignore the rights of minor 
parties.117  This had resulted, he explained, from individuals putting 
adherence to political factions over the public good.118 
                                                                                                                         
from any share in the [ordinary lawmaking functions].”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
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[40] Madison warned that, where unchecked by legal means, majorities 
often become oppressive.119  He cautioned that such oppression is greatest 
in a pure democracy, which:   
 
can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.  A 
common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be 
felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and 
concert results from the form of government itself; and 
there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the 
weaker party, or an obnoxious individual.  Hence it is, that 
such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence 
and contention; have ever been found incompatible with 
personal security or the rights of property; and have in 
general been as short in their lives, as they have been 
violent in their deaths.  Theoretic politicians, who have 
patronized this species of government, have erroneously 
supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in 
their political rights, they would, at the same time, be 
perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, 
their opinions, and their passions.120 
 
[41] Madison continued that a representative republic “promises the cure 
for which we are seeking.”121  The Framers set up a federal republic form 
of government to limit the majoritarian passions to which a truly national, 
democratic government would be susceptible.122  Madison explained: 
 
[The Constitution is] neither wholly National nor wholly 
Federal.  Were it wholly National, the supreme and 
ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the 
People of the Union; and this authority would be competent 
at all times, like that of a majority of every National society 
to alter or abolish its established Government . . . The mode 
provided by the Plan of the Convention is not founded on 
either of these principles.  In requiring more than a 
                                                 
119
 Id. at 60. 
120
 Id. at 60-61. 
121
 Id. at 61. 
122
 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38 at 265 (James Madison) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1888). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 4 
 
18 
majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by 
States, not by citizens, it departs from the National and 
advances toward the Federal character . . .123 
 
[42] The Framers, Madison in particular, gave a great deal of thought to 
citizen involvement in government.  Their choice to create a republican 
government recognized the limitations of citizens as legislators.  Many 
now argue the Internet has eliminated those limitations.  
 
B. THE CHANGE MADE POSSIBLE BY THE INTERNET 
 
[43] The Internet has certainly alleviated some of the problems the 
Founders saw with direct democracy.  Madison, for example, pointed out 
that a republican government could be maintained over a greater 
geographic area than a pure democracy.124  However, the rise of electronic 
communications media, and of the Internet in particular, has destroyed the 
argument that it is impractical in a mass society to bring citizens together 
in a town hall to debate policy matters.125  The ability to bring people 
together, though, does not address the Framers’ concern, reflected in the 
structure of the Constitution, that the People are too liable to act from 
passion and for personal interest without regard for the greater good.126 
 
[44] This article takes no position on the criticisms that direct participation 
in government by citizens is a recipe for disaster because citizens are 
incapable of preparing themselves for such a role.127  Our Constitution 
simply does not allow the types of direct democracy advocated by the 
various writers.  This bar to the drastic changes sought by those advocates 
does not mean, however, that the Constitution bars all methods of 
increasing citizen participation in governance. 
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[45] Political participation and voting could be made easier thanks to the 
newly cheap and abundant access to information technology.128  
Moreover, the costs of participating – both as citizen and legislator – could 
be reduced by allowing cheap methods for constituents to contact their 
legislators.129  Citizens could exert direct influence over willing legislators 
by meeting for online discussions.130  Retaining our representative 
democracy, enhanced by direct contact between citizens and legislators, 
could maximize participation while avoiding the tyranny of the majority 
likely to result from total direct democracy.131  This system, which might 
be effected by the legislator’s blog on which this article is based, would 
provide citizens a greater say in governance without running afoul of the 
Constitution.132 
 
3. THE ADAPTATION OF POLITICS TO THE INTERNET 
 
[46] As the Internet has changed the way society interacts, it has also 
changed how politicians campaign and interact with voters.  Slowly at 
first, the Internet has infused politics.  After starting as an after-thought 
appealing to small segments of the populace, the Internet has become a 
crucial tool in the political arsenal. 
 
[47] The World Wide Web made its political campaign debut in 1992.  
The Clinton-Gore campaign initiated use of the Web in presidential 
campaigns by posting speeches, position papers, and biographical 
information on a website.133  After this simple beginning, calls came 
quickly from some quarters to use new technologies to change the nature 
of governance. 
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[48] Also in 1992, presidential candidate Ross Perot called for direct 
democracy through an “electronic town hall.”134  Perot’s idea was to 
present policy issues to the People along with the costs and benefits of 
proposals for resolution then let the public comment about the proposals 
online.  Perot argued this would remove interest groups from politics.135 
 
[49] While his vision obviously has not been fulfilled, some action did 
follow Perot’s call for direct democracy through electronic town meetings.  
In September 1993, the Public Agenda Foundation held a two-hour 
electronic town meeting in San Antonio, Texas using the city’s interactive 
cable television system.136  Two Foundation representatives moderated a 
panel discussion among eight citizens concerning seven options for cutting 
health care costs.137  Also in the 1990s, the Community Service 
Foundation formed the Electronic Congress (“EC”).138  The EC let citizens 
call a toll-free number to enter their opinions on national issues.139  
Additionally, in the mid-1990s, a commercial company known as Vote 
Link set up a website providing fora for online public meetings at which 
participants can debate public issues.140  Finally, in 1995, residents of 
Reading, Pennsylvania used video-conferencing software and cable call-in 
shows to debate local and national issues.141 
 
[50] Despite these private sector experiments, neither society nor 
politicians in 1992 seemed ready for a marked shift in the nature of 
politics or governance.  Still, the Internet slowly expanded its importance.  
In 1996, for the first time, candidates for office at all levels of government 
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had websites to communicate information to citizens.142  Also in 1996, 
Lamar Alexander became the first political candidate to engage in an 
interactive chat session as part of his campaign.143  Alexander’s foray into 
interactivity, however, was the high point for using the Internet’s potential 
in campaigning in the 1990s. 
 
[51] Until at least 2000, much of Internet politics was limited to websites 
that were “little more than electronic yard signs.”144  During the early era 
of Internet campaigning, campaigns simply maintained passive websites 
as repositories for biographies, press releases, and other traditional 
campaign material.145  Mainstream politicians, while they perhaps saw the 
Internet as a means to supplement their campaign, seemed not to see the 
potential for truly connecting with citizens electronically.  Indeed, a 
computer columnist in 1996 noted most contenders for the presidency 
refused his request that they participate in a week-long online debate in 
which the candidates would take questions from the media, citizens, and 
their fellow candidates.146 
 
[52] Despite the scant attention it received from politicians during the 
1990s, early online political activists expected the Internet to be “the 
dominant political medium by the year 2000.”147  While their timetable for 
dominance may have been a bit optimistic, the massive growth in Internet 
use during the last few years of the twentieth century began the push in 
that direction.  In 1997, only eighteen percent of households had an 
Internet connection.  By 2000, that number had grown to forty-two 
percent.148  During this period, “thousands of citizens [became] high-tech 
colonial pamphleteers in a planetary public square, using computers and 
modems to recruit and organize without leaving their keyboards.”149 
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[53] Thanks to increased accessibility, by the 2000 election, presidential 
candidates viewed the Internet as an ally.  Candidates used the Internet to 
raise money, to make announcements, and to post their policy positions, 
speeches, and criticisms of their adversaries.150  Also by the 2000 election 
cycle, candidates had begun coupling these less-passive websites with 
database technology to identify likely voters who might be receptive to 
their messages.151  This technology let politicians tailor their messages to 
specific voters so they could, through technology, establish a “personal, 
one-on-one relationship” with citizens.152 
 
[54] The next step in cultivating a direct relationship with voters online 
logically would seem to be personal appearances online.  Some politicians 
sought to follow Lamar Alexander’s lead by using the Internet to expand 
their personal reach.  During the 2000 presidential race, Republican 
candidate Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr. took part in a town hall meeting by 
appearing at the meeting over the Internet.153 John McCain, another 
Republican candidate, held an online fundraiser showing a live video feed 
of his wife reading questions and him answering the questions.154  
Democrat Al Gore and Republican George W. Bush also had an online 
debate which received little viewer interest.155 
 
[55] As candidates used the Internet more effectively, other groups did as 
well.  Activists and protesters used the Internet to spread their messages 
and organize their activities.156  These higher levels of online activities 
again reflected the increasing use of the Internet in everyday life.  By 
2003, 54.7 percent of American households had Internet access.157  As a 
result, the Internet was ready to play a critical role in political 
campaigning. 
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[56] In the 2004 election cycle, Democrats used the Internet to fuel their 
political machines.  Candidate Howard Dean used the Internet to attract 
supporters and raise money.158  By the time Dean lost the Democratic 
nomination for the presidency, he had compiled an e-mail list of 600,000 
people.159  Democratic nominee John Kerry inherited the list, allowing his 
campaign to raise more campaign money than the campaign of his 
opponent, incumbent President George W. Bush.160  Yet, despite the 
fundraising disadvantage, Bush still won because Republicans increased 
their turnout at the polls more than the Democrats.161  This surely resulted 
at least in part from Bush’s Internet efforts, which included a total e-mail 
list of 7.5 million names and 1.4 million volunteers.162 
 
[57] In addition, by 2004, the Internet already had a place on the fringes of 
governance.  Governments throughout the United States had begun trying 
to connect the public to the government through “e-government” 
initiatives.  These programs allow citizens to e-mail government staff 
directly and to access public services online.163  These initiatives are 
essential.  With Internet usage pervasive in the Nation’s schools, the 
coming generation of adults will have no memory of an off-line world.164 
 
[58] Accordingly, while it may have been premature in 1992, many 
believe the Internet is now ripe for “deliberative democracy.”165  Former 
presidential adviser Dick Morris has argued that “[t]he incredible speed 
and interactivity of the Internet will inevitably return our country to a de 
facto system of direct democracy by popular referendum.  The town-
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meeting style of government will become a national reality.”166  Already 
candidates for Congress and governorships have, in a few cases, allowed 
for electronic-town-hall style interactions between candidate and citizens.  
A few candidates have, for example, invited citizens to post questions to 
which the candidate would respond directly and taken part in regularly-
scheduled “chats” on their websites.167 
 
[59] With so many developments in the last ten years leading to the 
infiltration of the Internet in politics, a policy debate has begun regarding 
the wisdom of taking the next step in Internet utilization.  Some 
commentators argue the principles of democracy are best served by 
engaging in direct democracy via the Internet because of the multitude of 
background materials available for review online.  Others, however, claim 
democracy would be disserved by online direct democracy because 
citizens would ignore opinions inconsistent with their own.168  
Additionally, some assert that lawmakers should not engage in web-based 
discussions because the “digital divide” – the fact Web users are 
disproportionately white and well-to-do – will result in a skewed view of 
their constituents’ opinions.169 
 
[60] Despite the reservations, some observers still describe grass roots 
communication with candidates and officials via Internet as a coming 
revolution of electronic democracy.170  In light of the massive changes 
already effected by the proliferation of Internet use, one can hardly 
question that the Internet is a “revolutionary force.”171  As discussed in the 
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next section, new Internet technology has simplified direct communication 
between groups of people and the formation of online communities to the 
extent that politicians could readily interact with their constituents.  In 
order to allow online citizen participation in a representative democracy, 
however, the legislator would have to open the forum to all interested 
citizens.172  For the reasons set out in Section III, detailing the applicable 
First Amendment constraints, the risk of opening such a forum would 
carry too much political risk for legislators. 
 
A. THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF BLOGS ENTERS SOCIETY 
 
[61] Communication over the Internet has always been relatively easy.  
Recently, however, engaging in true personal conversations has become as 
easy as posting materials to a website.  This generally occurs via web logs, 
also known as “blogs.”173   
 
[62] Blogs are usually written and maintained by individuals or small 
groups known as “bloggers.”174  Their content, however, is accessible to 
anyone with an Internet connection.175  Blogs are online diaries or journals 
discussing a variety of topics.176  Both the nature and prevalence of blogs 
have changed dramatically in the past decade. 
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[63] Only a handful of blogs existed in 1997 and 1998.177  At that time, 
only people well versed in HTML178 and with the free time to build and 
maintain a site requiring daily updates had blogs.179  Early blogs were 
organized around links to other sites.180  Bloggers acted as human filters 
for the Internet by providing links, coupled with their own commentary, to 
people, information, or sites they found interesting.181  While not always 
sophisticated, these sites marked the beginning of a movement to include 
the public in the media, letting individuals praise, criticize, or correct 
content posted on other sites or blogs.182 
 
[64] The style of blogs soon began to change, however.  Beginning in 
1999, software developers began releasing various do-it-yourself tools for 
building blogs.183  Thus, blogs are now easy to set up and require no 
knowledge of computer programming.184  While the link-driven-style 
blogs still exist, most new bloggers use their blogs as online personal 
journals instead of guides to the content of the web.185  Bloggers record 
their personal thoughts and relate important events on their blogs for all 
the world to see.186  This style of blogging soon led to full-blown 
conversations between blogs in which one blogger would respond to 
postings on another blog while providing a link to the responded-to 
blog.187 
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[65] Thus, modern bloggers are primarily concerned with posting their 
thoughts on specific topics.188  The postings are then organized in 
chronological order, making each blog a sort of archived opinion page.189  
Blogs also allow readers to post responses or comments.190  The ability for 
readers to leave comments about materials on a blog fosters a dialogue 
between bloggers.191  Instead of posting static information, the comment 
feature makes blogs interactive as readers respond to the initial comment 
posted on the blog and then to each other’s responses.192 
 
[66] These unique features have resulted in mammoth growth in blogging.  
In a January 2005 report, the Pew Internet & American Life Project 
reported that seven percent of the 120 million Internet users in the United 
States had created a blog.  That amounts to more than eight million 
bloggers.193  One report had the number of bloggers reaching eleven 
million by August 2005.194  Further, by the end of 2004, twenty-seven 
percent of Internet users, or thirty-two million Americans, reported 
reading blogs.195  This marked a seventeen percent increase over those 
admitting blog readership in February of that year.196  This increase was 
likely traceable to coverage of the 2004 presidential election.  Nine 
percent of Internet users said they “frequently” or “sometimes” read 
political blogs during the campaign.197  Additionally, twelve percent of 
Internet users have posted comments or other material on a blog.198 
                                                 
188
 See Steve Rubel, The Rise of Business Blogging, 
http://www.webpronews.com/news/ebusinessnews/wpn-45-
20050131TheRiseofBusinessBlogging.html (last modified Jan. 31, 2005). 
189
 Id. 
190
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 See Dave Taylor, The Intuitive Life Business Blog, 
http://www.intuitive.com/blog/whats_the_difference_ 
between_a_blog_and_a_web_site.html (last visited June 7, 2007). 
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 See Lee Rainie, The State of Blogging, 
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(last visited June 7, 2007). 
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[67] The ease and speed of blogging distinguishes it from other modes of 
speech.  Posting material immediately makes it available to all the world’s 
Internet users.199  As a result, “blogs are an emerging form of legitimate 
and widespread communication of both fact and opinion . . . .”200  Blogs 
democratize journalism by letting the People speak.  This results in 
dissemination of expert opinions the public otherwise would not hear.201  
For example, the “Baghdad Blogger,” Salam Pax, maintained an online 
diary of life in wartime Iraq.202  Professor Juan Cole’s blog provides 
scholarly discussion of Shiite Arabs and how Sunni Arabs are using the 
current American military presence in Iraq as a major recruiting tool.203 
 
[68] Business has even begun to recognize the value of apparently honest, 
unpolished communications.  Though still relatively rare, some major 
corporations have created blogs for use by both employees and 
customers.204  These companies, slowly and often hesitantly, have 
recognized the value of blogs as a marketing tool.205  Companies such as 
Sun Microsystems, Inc. and Google have encouraged employees to blog 
on a corporate site.206  These companies see their blogs as a way to 
enhance communication with customers and to build a type of 
community.207  Companies may also use blogs to facilitate communication 
between management and employees.208 
 
                                                 
199
 See Peterson, supra note 175, at 10 (“[A] click of the mouse potentially will publish 
the writer’s thoughts to millions of readers.”) 
200
 Id. at 44. 
201
 Mortimer B. Zuckerman, The Wild, Wild Web, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 5, 
2005, at 76. 
202
 Id.  The blog, not updated since August 18, 2004, can be found at 
http://dear_raed.blogspot.com. 
203
 Id.  Professor Cole’s blog is located at http://www.juancole.com. 
204
 See Patricia Kitchen, Change At Work: Blogging Bluepoint: Keys to Writing a Web 
Journal that Can Help Your Career, Not Harm It, NEWSDAY, Dec. 3, 2004, at E40. 
205
 See Amy Joyce, Free Expression Can Be Costly When Bloggers Bad-Mouth Jobs, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at A01; see also Peterson, supra note 175, at 10. 
206
 See Joyce, supra note 205, at A01.  Other companies with corporate blogs include 
Yahoo!, Nike, GM, and Intuit.  See Rubel, supra note 188. 
207
 See Joyce, supra note 205, at A01. 
208
 See Peterson, supra note 175, at 10. 
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[69] Software giant Microsoft successfully used blogs to restore its image 
in the wake of the United States’ antitrust suit against the company.209  
Beginning in 2001, Microsoft encouraged employees to blog about the 
company and its products.210  The employees’ passionate musings added 
an authentic voice that put a human face on the giant company.211  The 
program was so successful that, between 2001 and 2005, Microsoft’s 
blogging corps grew to more than 1,200 bloggers.212 
 
[70] Blogs are unlike traditional websites in the corporate or political 
realm.  Not just information conduits, blogs reflect the personalities of 
their individual authors.213  Because of this, though, all is not roses in the 
blogging world.  Bloggers view blogs as a place to vent and to speak 
frankly.  “[T]he ethos of the blogosphere is to be chatty and sometimes 
catty and crude.”214   The unrestricted nature of blog postings has proven 
problematic in the business world, with several known instances – readily 
discussed on various blogs – of employees being fired for blog postings 
critical of their employer or co-workers.215  Google, for example, has 
disciplined an employee for “improper” postings.216 
 
[71] Accordingly, blogs may be just as harmful as they may be helpful.  
“At their best, blogs provide a civil, usually lucid, and running debate 
about subjects of public interest and concern.  At their worst, blogs are 
potentially defamatory, profane, and rife with rumor and misstatements of 
fact.”217  One with knowledge of the content in a blog posting potentially 
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 Joyce, supra note 205, at A01 (quoting interview with Lee Rainie, director of the Pew 
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could be liable for discrimination, harassment, or defamation of others.218  
While this risk can be minimized in the employment setting with a 
blogging policy,219 a legislator faces special constraints in applying an 
equivalent blog-posting policy.220 
 
[72] Nevertheless, politicians cannot ignore blogs.  Blogs have gained 
favor because they combine the tone of a personal conversation with the 
accessibility of a website.221  Blogs are attractive and powerful, no matter 
what the topic, because of their authenticity.222  They are authored by 
individuals with a passion for the topics discussed and, by using feedback 
to create a dialogue, they create an ongoing, honest conversation.223  
Creating or contributing to a blog allows citizens not only to join in the 
public debate, but also to make a meaningful contribution by fostering 
critical thinking skills essential to an informed electorate.224 
 
I. BLOGS ENTER POLITICS 
 
[73] Lawrence Lessig has described blogging as “one of the most 
important opportunities” citizens have to create an alternative to existing 
media.225  No longer just using campaign bulletin boards, volunteers and 
activists have begun spreading their own perspectives on blogs.  The 
power of blogs already showed itself in the 2004 election cycle as 
Republican bloggers took on the “mainstream media” and won.  On 
September 8, 2004, CBS’s Dan Rather reported on documents allegedly 
showing President Bush had been absent during much of his National 
Guard service in the early 1970s.  When CBS posted the documents, 
allegedly created in 1972, on its website, Republican bloggers 
                                                 
218
 See Swaya & Eisenstein, supra note 173, at 5; see, e.g., Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, 
Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. 2000) (ruling an airline could be held liable for a pilot 
describing a female pilot as a “feminazi” on the employer’s electronic bulletin board). 
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 See Swaya & Eisenstein, supra note 173, at 5. 
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 See infra Parts III.B.2-3. 
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 See Tessler, supra note 85 (quoting interview with Michael Cornfield of the Pew 
Internet & American Life Project). 
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 See Rubel, supra note 188. 
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 Id. 
224
 See Julie China, Blogger’s Anonymous, FEDERAL LAWYER, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 6. 
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 See Eric Hellweg, Lawrence Lessig Talks Copyright and the Supreme Court, South by 
Southwest, http://www.sxsw.com/interactive/tech_report/recent_interviews/l_lessig/ (last 
visited May 22, 2006). 
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immediately challenged them as modern forgeries.226  After eleven days of 
defending the documents, the evidence of forgery became overwhelming, 
leading CBS to admit an error in airing the story and to Rather’s 
resignation as news anchor.227 
 
[74] Republicans have not, however, been alone in taking advantage of the 
power of blogs.  In 2005, Democratic bloggers railed against comments by 
Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott praising Strom Thurmond’s 
1948 segregationalist presidential campaign.228  True to Lessig’s 
prediction, the bloggers’ efforts forced the mainstream media to give the 
story more attention and ultimately led to Lott’s resignation of his 
leadership post.229 
 
[75] Thus, speech on blogs already has become a tool for influencing 
political tides – “the modern equivalent of political pamphleteering.”230  
Having already gained influence and demonstrated successes, blogs took 
another leap toward mainstream credibility in 2004 when the Democratic 
National Committee let some political bloggers, many with no journalistic 
training, attend and blog about its convention.231  Finally, on November 
18, 2005, the Federal Election Commission stated in an advisory opinion 
that blogs operated by Fired Up! LLC were “the online equivalent of a 
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication.”232  The blogs were, 
therefore, exempt from campaign finance limits and regulation pursuant to 
the statutory press exception.233 
 
[76] Blogs have become powerful tools in many sectors of society, 
including politics and the shaping of public opinion.  They allow people to 
                                                 
226
 See Barone, supra note 158, at 42; see also Tessler, supra note 85 (noting bloggers 
first expressed doubts regarding the authenticity of the documents); Rubel, supra note 
188 (same). 
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create a close-knit community from remote locations.234  This tool, then, 
seems tailor made for politicians – either because they genuinely want to 
interact with and hear the opinions of their constituents or because they 
want to give the appearance that they are interested in what their 
constituents have to say.  The upside for a legislator blogging with 
constituents seems great.  Unfortunately, as we shall see, the downside is 
probably greater. 
 
III. WHY POLITICIANS SHOULD FEAR BLOGGING WITH CONSTITUENTS 
 
[77] The chance for full and frank discussion between legislator and 
constituent is a benefit of interactive communication via the Internet.  One 
study concluded conversations occurring over a network resulted in all 
participants having a roughly equal say in the discussion, unlike many in-
person meetings that are dominated by one or two people.235  The same 
study also found people typically reluctant to speak in personal meetings 
were more comfortable speaking in a networked setting.236 
 
[78] The problem with interactivity, though, is lack of control over the 
respondent.  This may manifest itself in many ways.  Most obviously is 
the potential lack of control over who chooses to join the conversation.  A 
survey of candidates for office in 1996 showed those with websites 
allowing users to e-mail the candidate received many messages from non-
constituents.237  Candidates do not want to spend their time with 
anonymous citizens who may not be able to vote for them.238  This 
problem, however, can be resolved with relatively little trouble.239 
                                                 
234
 In probably the most powerful show of the Internet’s power as a political tool to date, 
a soldier serving in the war in Iraq won a seat on the city council of Grand Forks, North 
Dakota.  With support from family members who handed out fliers, held a campaign 
rally, and put up signs around the town, the soldier appealed directly to voters by 
answering questions via e-mail.  See Internet Campaign From Iraq Wins Dakota 
Election, CNN.COM, June 15, 2006, available at 
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 See Lee Sproull & Sara Kiesler, Computers, Networks, and Work, 265 SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN 3, Sept. 1991, at 116, 119. 
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 Id. at 120. 
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[79] More important from the legislator’s perspective is the loss of control 
over his or her message.  While the Internet has many attributes, it also has 
a “dark side,” in that people can publish what they want on the Internet 
without fact checking.240  They are able to “post commentary, news, rumor 
and ruminations online . . . .”241  In order to attract attention in a diffuse 
and saturated media world, bloggers often seek attention by posting 
inflammatory or scurrilous matters without concern for fact checking.242  
People also tend to express more extreme opinions over the Internet than 
in personal conversations.243 
 
[80] It is true that “[b]logging empowers average citizens to be able to 
speak to mass audiences” even if they cannot “afford a printing press or a 
radio station.”244 Such great reach means that, unless the forum were 
tightly censored, participants could write anything and leave it on the 
                                                                                                                         
(Brennan, J., concurring). See also id. at 575 (plurality opinion) (the “expressly 
guaranteed freedoms” of the First Amendment “share a common core purpose of assuring 
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government”).  In 
order to make such communication feasible, however, the legislator would have to 
apportion time and/or access equitably.  See BUDGE, supra note 100, at 115 (stating 
efficiency in a direct democracy would require government to apportion time equitably).  
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responding to messages from non-constituents to the exclusion of those whose opinions 
should shape her actions.  Similarly, the legislator would have to ensure her server space 
was not consumed by non-constituent postings to the exclusion of constituent 
communications.  To maintain the viability of the communication method, the First 
Amendment would permit a time, place, or manner restriction on those who could use the 
blog.  See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (reasonable time, place, or 
manner restrictions on speech are permitted so long as they “are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and . . . they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information”)  (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).  One might imagine many permissible 
technological solutions to these problems.  Most obviously, the First Amendment should 
permit the legislator to require constituents to register for the site by providing a name 
and address, which could be checked either manually or electronically against the voter 
registry.  Similarly, the server could be programmed to delete all messages after they had 
been posted for a pre-determined, reasonable period of time. 
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legislator’s blog for all others to see.245  In the context of the modern 
debate over how to deal with illegal immigrants from Mexico, many 
legislators would be unwilling to have posted on their blogs a statement 
such as “send the dirty Mexicans back home.”246  As demonstrated in the 
remainder of this article, however, the First Amendment would not permit 
a legislator to censor his or her blog. 
 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
 
[81] Of course, the right to engage in political speech is the central 
component of the First Amendment’s speech clause.247  The First 
Amendment demonstrates our “‘profound national commitment’ to the 
principle that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open . . . .’”248  The Supreme Court has developed the public forum 
doctrine to further this commitment by permitting free speech at times and 
locations at which the speech is likely to be meaningful.249  The doctrine 
also provides “a metaphorical reference point” for protecting speech in all 
locations.250 
 
[82] By granting a right to speak on public property, the government has 
ensured all speakers have a forum for distributing their messages.251  
Further, the government subsidizes speech in these fora by not enforcing 
trespass or theft laws against those who use the fora for speech without 
paying for upkeep, security, etc.252  Thus, the public forum doctrine acts as 
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 Kamarck, supra note 145, at 98. 
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OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1535 (1998). 
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in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 161-62 (Fall 1998). 
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repugnant views as they use the public property). 
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a “First Amendment easement”253 ensuring access regardless of the 
preferences of the government owners or the private users of the 
property.254 
 
[83] Yet, government is not required to permit all forms of speech on its 
property.  Where the government acts as manager over its internal 
operations instead of as a lawmaker with regulatory power, its acts are not 
subject to heightened review.255  This approach is reflected in the Court’s 
“forum based” approach to reviewing speech restrictions on government 
property.256 
 
[84] The Supreme Court first referred to a public forum analysis in 1939.  
It said then that citizens had speech rights on streets and in parks because 
those locations had “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”257  As discussed below, this remains the heart of the public 
forum doctrine. 
 
[85] As Professor Gey has pointed out, the Hague case is a weak 
foundation for a free speech doctrine.  The famous language giving rise to 
the public forum doctrine is merely dicta in a plurality opinion.258  
Moreover, the Hague plurality did not refute the prevailing view, 
expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes as a state judge,259 that government 
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 Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum:  Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 13. 
254
 See Zatz, supra note 251, at 172. 
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had the right to control its property to the same extent as private property 
owners.260 
 
[86] The Court, however, soon removed any confusion by expressly 
adopting the Hague dicta and rejecting the early Holmes view.261  The 
Court then slowly narrowed the scope of the public forum doctrine by 
focusing on the three specific types of property identified in Hague and 
carving out exceptions even for those “traditional” public fora.262  Forty 
years after creating the public forum concept in Hague, the Court set the 
restrictive modern public forum analysis.263 
 
[87] In this analytical framework, the extent to which the First 
Amendment allows a government to restrict speech on the government’s 
own property depends on the character of the forum.264  The Supreme 
Court has identified three categories of analysis for public forum purposes.  
First are those places that, by tradition or government declaration, have 
been devoted to assembly and debate.265   
 
1. TRADITIONAL PUBLIC FORA 
 
[88] The classic description of the traditional public forum remains 
Hague’s reference to streets, sidewalks, and parks immemorially held in 
trust for the public.266  The Supreme Court, however, has provided some 
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additional contour to its description.  The traditional public forum is 
property that has as “a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of 
ideas.”267  Such property is “continually open, often uncongested, and 
constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality’s 
citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the open air or the 
company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment.”268   
 
[89] Thus, a traditional public forum is one with “the physical 
characteristics of a public thoroughfare, . . . the objective use and purpose 
of open public access or some other objective use and purpose inherently 
compatible with expressive conduct, [and] historical[ly] and traditional[ly] 
has been used for expressive conduct . . .”269  All such fora share a 
common trait in that open access and viewpoint neutrality are “compatible 
with the intended purposes of the property.”270  The requirements of 
openness and neutrality mean content-based restrictions in these fora are 
subject to strict scrutiny.271 
 
2. DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORA 
 
[90] Of course, the First Amendment is not absolute.  “The Constitution 
does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly 
of the whole.”272  Nor does the First Amendment mean “that people who 
want to (voice) their views have a constitutional right to do so whenever 
and however and wherever they please.”273  Thus, government bodies may 
meet in executive session without public access.274 
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[91] The First Amendment requires a different result, however, where a 
governmental body has chosen to open its decision-making processes to 
public participation.275  Its action creates “a public forum dedicated to the 
expression of views by the general public.”276  Thus, the second category 
recognized by the public forum doctrine consists of public property 
opened by the government for expressive activity by the public.277 
 
[92] Aside from the traditional public forum, the government must act 
intentionally to create a public forum.278  To do so, the government must 
“intentionally open[] a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”279  
Governmental inaction does not create a public forum.280  The location of 
the property is also relevant to determining its status.  A property’s 
separation from acknowledged public forum property may demonstrate 
that it is separate from and more restricted than the public forum 
property.281 
 
[93] The key in determining whether government property that is not a 
traditional public forum has been designated as a public forum is how the 
property is used.282  The government’s intent in constructing the space and 
its need to control expressive activity are also relevant.  These factors can 
be isolated by looking to policies or regulations regarding the forum.283  
Similarly, the government can demonstrate it did not intend to create a 
forum for speech by pointing to litigation in which it sought to limit 
speech in the alleged forum.284 
 
[94] The Court gave some guidance in applying these principles to 
determine when the government will be held to have established a 
designated public forum.  Where the government allows occasional but 
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only limited use of a property that is otherwise specifically reserved for its 
employees, it does not create a public forum.  Thus, a school’s internal 
mail system, used for transmitting official messages between teachers and 
administration, exchange of personal messages among teachers, and 
occasionally for transmission of messages from civic organizations,285 was 
not a public forum.286  Similarly, no public forum exists where the 
property serves a commercial function and must remain attractive to the 
marketplace.  A property’s commercial nature suggests the property’s 
purpose is something other than “promoting ‘the free exchange of 
ideas.’”287  As such, an airport terminal is not a public forum.288 
 
[95] When the government opens a designated public forum, however, it is 
stuck with the consequences of its action.289  Restrictions on speech in 
designated public fora are treated with the same skepticism as restrictions 
in traditional public fora.290  Although the government was not required to 
open the forum and can close a designated public forum,291 restrictions 
imposed in a designated public forum are subject to strict scrutiny so long 
as the government leaves the forum open for expression.292 
 
A. LIMITED PUBLIC FORA 
 
[96] Nonetheless, because the designated public forum is a creature of 
government action, the government can exercise more control over the 
forum by setting limits when it creates the forum.  Perry recognized, in 
addition to the designated public forum, the limited public forum.293  
                                                 
285
 See Perry Ed. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983). 
286
 Id. at 46. 
287
 Lee, 505 U.S. at 682 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).   
288
 Lee, 505 U.S. at 682. 
289
 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) 
(explaining that, after the government opens a forum, it “must respect the lawful 
boundaries it has itself set.”). 
290
 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 678. 
291
 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
292
 Id.   
293
 Id. at 46 n.7.  Some confusion exists in the circuit courts regarding the limited public 
forum category.  Some circuits treat the terms designated public forum and limited public 
forum as synonymous while others regard the limited public forum as a sub-category of a 
designated public forum where the designated forum is open only to certain speakers or 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 4 
 
40 
When the government opens a limited public forum, it limits the forum to 
communications by certain groups294 or addressing certain subjects.295 
 
[97] As with a designated public forum, the government must 
affirmatively open a limited public forum.296  When it does so, it may 
choose the types of speakers and/or subjects that will be permitted in the 
forum.297  The government, however, does not create a limited public 
forum when it grants “selective access for individual speakers rather than 
general access for a class of speakers.”298   
 
[98] Still, although a state is not required to permit all manners of speech 
or speakers when it opens a limited public forum,299 the government’s 
authority in this forum is not boundless.  The government may not 
discriminate based on viewpoint, and any restrictions imposed “must be 
‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’”300  Thus, the 
government may not selectively deny access for speech or activities of the 
genre for which it opened the forum.301  The government may, however, 
exclude expression beyond the genre for which it opened the limited 
public forum so long as its actions are viewpoint neutral and reasonable.302 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
for certain subjects.  See Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975-76 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(collecting cases and describing split).  The distinction is significant because 
governmental restrictions on speech of a type not allowed in a limited public forum must 
only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  Id. at 976. 
294
 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citing generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 
(1981)). 
295
 See id. (citing generally City of Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations 
Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)). 
296
 See Hotel Emples. & Rest. Emples. Union v. City of New York Dep’t of Parks & 
Rec., 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002). 
297
 Id. 
298
 Ark. Educ. TV Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998). 
299
 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). 
300
 Id. at 106-07 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 
806 (1985)).  See also infra discussion of reasonableness in the following section on non-
public fora. 
301
 See Hotel Emples.& Rest. Emples., 311 F.3d at 545-46. 
302
 Id. at 546. 
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3. NON-PUBLIC FORA 
 
[99] The last category encompasses government property that is neither by 
tradition nor by designation a public forum.303  When determining whether 
a property is a non-public forum, “[t]he crucial question is whether the 
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of 
a particular place at a particular time.”304  “When government property is 
not dedicated to open communication[,] the government may – without 
further justification – restrict use to those who participate in the forum’s 
official business.”305 
 
[100] The government’s power as property owner is at its zenith in this 
class of property.  Government may preserve the intended purposes of the 
forum – whether communicative or not – so long as its regulations on 
speech are reasonable and not an effort to suppress a speaker’s 
viewpoint.306  The government’s actions “can be based on subject matter 
and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in 
light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”307  
Further, its actions need only be reasonable.  The government’s chosen 
restrictions do not have to “be the most reasonable or the only reasonable 
limitation.”308 
 
[101] The reasonableness of the restrictions imposed in a non-public 
forum are viewed “in the light of the purpose of the forum and all 
surrounding circumstances,”309 and must be “consistent with the 
[government’s] legitimate interest in preserving the property for the use to 
which it is lawfully dedicated.”310  A speech restriction in a non-public 
                                                 
303
 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
304
 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). 
305
 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 53. 
306
 See id. at 46. 
307
 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
308
 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (quoting 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730). 
309
 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985). 
310
 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51.  The same 
analysis applies to exclusions from limited public fora based on a speaker’s alleged 
noncompliance with the limitations on expression in the forum.  See supra text 
accompanying note 300. 
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forum, therefore, is “reasonable” when it is “consistent with the 
[government’s] legitimate interest in preserving the property . . . for the 
use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”311 
 
4. IMPACT OF THE MODERN PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS 
 
[102] The public forum doctrine protects access to those locations most 
important to fulfill the goal of the First Amendment.312  The protection of 
speech on certain government property reinforces “the idea that we are a 
free people” by giving citizens notice that they may exercise their 
freedoms on such property without fear of government censorship.313  
Because government authority to limit speech in this realm is premised on 
the government’s ownership of the property, the public forum doctrine 
furthers our concept of limited government by focusing on the physical 
characteristics of the property to curtail regulation where the property is 
appropriate for speech.314 
 
[103] The tri-partite public forum analysis is protective of speech in 
traditional public fora and designated public fora.  However, these classes 
are quite narrow.  Because the government must declare a designated (or 
limited) public forum and it is able to set the parameters of its designation, 
the designated public forum category “provides little, if any, additional 
protection to speech.”315  Moreover, in a nonpublic forum, the analysis 
revives the pre-Hague property owner analysis allowing the government 
to exclude speakers so long as they are not excluded on the basis of 
viewpoint.316  The sharp limitation on access to non-public fora is also 
significant given the Court’s focus on governmental intent as to how a 
forum should be used.  This analysis has two sides.  First, a forum is only 
converted from non-public forum to public forum if the government so 
                                                 
311
 Id. (quoting Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assn’s, 453 U.S. 114, 129-
30 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
312
 See Zatz, supra note 251, at 160-61. 
313
 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
314
 Id. 
315
 Id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Gey, supra note 249, at 1569-71 
(criticizing Justice Kennedy’s approach to public forum analysis for continuing to 
recognize the designated public forum category). 
316
 See Gey, supra note 249, at 1547-48. 
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intends.317  Second, even if the government allows conversion to a public 
forum, the government is able to limit the forum to the type of speech it 
prefers.318 
 
[104] As we set about to classify our legislator’s blog in the next section, 
we will see the legislator both protected and undermined by these First 
Amendment principles.  Ultimately, the burden of First Amendment 
protections for speakers on the blog will likely prove too great for the 
legislator to tolerate. 
 
B. BLOGS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
[105] Because the Internet is still quite new, the courts have given only 
limited guidance in how to apply traditional legal rules in the electronic 
setting.319  In fact, some scholars assert current First Amendment analysis, 
and the history- and tradition-based public forum doctrine in particular, 
are unworkable in this new age of technology.320  Such arguments are 
misguided. 
 
[106] No reason exists for treating the Internet differently than the off-line 
world in analyzing speech rights.  Speech serves the same purpose 
whether it is shouted across a park or streamed (or typed) over the 
Internet.  The Supreme Court has even recognized that “the same 
principles are applicable” to fora existing “more in a metaphysical than in 
a spatial or geographic sense.”321  In fact, the Court has already, in Reno v. 
ACLU,322 applied a typical First Amendment analysis in the Internet 
context.323 
 
                                                 
317
 See id. at 1548. 
318
 Id. 
319
 Nat’l A-1 Adver., Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F.Supp.2d 156, 167 (D.N.H. 
2000) (“Because of the relative novelty of the Internet, there is very little precedent 
applying traditional or familiar legal principles to its operation.”). 
320
 See, e.g., John J. Brogan, Speak & Space:  How the Internet Is Going to Kill the First 
Amendment As We Know It, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, at * 3 (Summer 2003). 
321
 Rosenberger v. Rector Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
322
 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
323
 See David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Cyber Forum:  
Public vs. Private In Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 9 (Winter 1998). 
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[107] As in any case, the first step in evaluating speech restrictions on 
government property is to determine the type of forum – traditional public 
forum, designated public forum, or non-public forum – involved.324  
Under the Perry analysis, classification is key.  Because the government 
almost always wins fights over access to non-public fora, the war is 
usually won on the classification battlefield.325 
 
[108] When considering the proper classification for First Amendment 
purposes, one must first identify the proper venue to be classified.  In the 
offline world, some government properties, like a university campus, may 
consist of multiple types of fora.326  Some parts of a campus, like 
classrooms and administrative offices, are non-public fora.  Other parts, 
like auditoriums, may be open to certain speech on certain topics, making 
them designated (or perhaps limited) public fora.  Finally, the campus is 
likely surrounded by and perhaps even traversed by public streets and 
sidewalks, which are traditional public fora.327 
 
[109] The Internet should be viewed as a similarly dynamic entity with 
some parts that are public fora and some parts that are non-public fora.328  
Because of its open architecture, the Internet clearly has areas that are 
public fora.  This does not mean, however, that every site on the Net is a 
public forum.  The question in any case is whether the one specific site 
with which we are concerned is a public forum.329 
 
1. THE LEGISLATOR’S BLOG IS A PUBLIC FORUM 
 
[110] If the courts have had little time to contemplate application of 
traditional principles to the Internet as a whole, they have had virtually no 
                                                 
324
 See, e.g., Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 974-75 (8th Cir. 2006); see also United 
States v. Kokinda , 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990) (explaining that in considering a speech 
restriction, one must consider the significance of the government interest in light of the 
nature and function of the forum at issue). 
325
 See Gey, supra note 249, at 1548. 
326
 See Bowman, 444 F.3d at 974-75. 
327
 Id. at 977. 
328
 See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 337 (arguing the Internet should be viewed as a city). 
329
 See id. at note 323, at 10 (Because the Internet is composed of parts marked by 
varying degrees of public access, “the important question will not be ‘Whether 
cyberspace is a public forum,’ but ‘Where are the public forums in cyberspace?’”). 
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occasion to consider applying legal doctrines to blogs.330  The one court to 
consider the matter held postings on a blog are entitled to First 
Amendment protection.331  The conclusion that the First Amendment can 
apply to blogs, however, far from resolves the inquiry.  We must 
determine whether a legislator’s blog, in particular, is subject to the First 
Amendment and, if so, to what level of First Amendment protection blog 
postings are entitled. 
 
A. THE LEGISLATOR, AS A STATE ACTOR, MUST COMPLY WITH THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
 
[111] It is axiomatic that the First Amendment only restricts government 
conduct.332  The structure of the Internet, however, is primarily owned and 
operated by private companies.333  Communications over private networks 
like that owned by America Online may face state action bars.334  This 
problem is overcome, however, where the government supplies or 
subsidizes the network.335 
                                                 
330
 See Peterson, supra note 175, at 8 (noting, given the recent rise of blogs, courts have 
not dealt with how to apply traditional legal rules). 
331
 See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005). 
332
 See, e.g., Public Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952). 
333
 See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 350. 
334
 See id. at 350-51. 
335
 Id. at 348.  One could conceive of a legislator trying to avoid the First Amendment 
pitfalls detailed in this article by using his private Internet account to host the blog on 
which he solicits constituent opinions.  While an exhaustive discussion of the 
implications of such an act is beyond the scope of this paper, the private actor barrier 
likely would not protect the legislator in that instance.  A private actor is deemed to be a 
state actor when it has a “symbiotic relationship” with the state.  See Perkins v. 
Londonberry Basketball Club, 196 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1999).  The symbiotic test is 
satisfied where the government is so intertwined with the actor as to be a joint participant 
with him.  Id. at 21.  A politician using his personal blog to solicit opinions from 
constituents to guide his official actions seems to be acting in conjunction with the 
government.  Moreover, even if a politician could be considered a private person under 
such circumstances, “state action may be found if . . . there is such a close nexus between 
the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated 
as that of the State itself.”  Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Even an unequivocally private 
actor like an Internet service provider would be subject to the First Amendment if it 
undertook clearly governmental functions, such as hosting an election.  See Goldstone, 
supra note 323 at 21-22.  The politician as private person soliciting political opinions he 
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[112] Most obviously, when the government supplies the network, no state 
action problem exists.  When the legislator is sued for violating the First 
Amendment by, for example, censoring the blog hosted on a government-
owned network server, the actor being challenged is unquestionably a 
government agent.336 
 
[113] The same result is obtained even if the government only subsidizes 
the network.  In the Internet context, no state action concerns arise where a 
governmental entity acts as a censor337 because the government action 
element is met where the discussion originates from a government-owned 
computer.338  State action simply is not a problem when the government is 
alleged to have committed the challenged action since the Constitution, 
Bill of Rights, and Amendments restrict governmental actions.339  
Maintenance of her blog on a government server for purposes of assisting 
her in performing her official duties indicates the legislator is acting in her 
governmental capacity, thus satisfying the state action test.340  Therefore, a 
politician attempting to censor a public forum meets the state action 
requirement.341 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
intends to use in his official acts seems to be acting in a way so closely related to his 
governmental function as to be considered a part of his state action. 
336
 See cf. Goldstone, supra note 9, at 354-57 (arguing the state action doctrine bars 
application of the First Amendment to private network operators). 
337
 See, e.g., Loving v. Boren, 956 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Okla. 1997) (no discussion of state 
action as an issue where professor at a state university sued the university for blocking 
access to Internet newsgroups).   
338
 See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 385. 
339
 See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 16.1 (3d ed. 1999). 
340
 See, e.g., Minshew v. Smith, 380 F. Supp. 918, 922 (W.D. Miss. 1974) (elected 
representative acting in his or her official capacity is a state actor); Adickes v. S.H. Kress 
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151 (1970) (involvement of a sheriff, a state actor, in 
unconstitutional conduct meets the state action test); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 364 
(1987) (legislator is a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes); ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 494 (2d ed. 2002) 
(state action exists when the actor undertaking the challenged act is a government 
employee acting as a government officer). 
341
 See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 9, at 379-80 (stating state action exists where 
hypothetical president attempts to silence a hypothetical conference). 
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B. CLASSIFYING THE LEGISLATOR’S BLOG 
 
[114] Having determined that the legislator’s blog is subject to First 
Amendment strictures, the next issue is the nature of the applicable 
limitations.  Because the Perry forum-based analysis provides different 
levels of protection depending on the type of forum at issue, we must 
determine into which category the legislator’s blog fits.  As demonstrated 
above, the public forum analysis is a two-step inquiry.  First, does a long 
tradition of public debate exist on the property?  If not, has the 
government opened the property as a place for expression?342 
 
[115] The public forum doctrine’s focus on the pedigree of property in 
deciding whether speech protection attaches leaves many unanswered 
questions.  Most crucial for a blog – or any speech on the Internet – is 
whether any particular duration of existence for a particular forum can 
meet the requirements of a traditional public forum.343  Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court seems to  have barred the recognition of new traditional 
public fora and limited the category to parks, streets, and sidewalks.344 
 
[116] In Lee, the Court rejected calls to recognize airport terminals as 
traditional public fora.  The majority reasoned that, “given the lateness 
with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly 
qualifies for the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of 
mind’ been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive 
activity.”345  If airport terminals in 1992 could not claim traditional public 
forum status, it seems unlikely the Internet would earn the title in 2007, 
and unfathomable that a blog would earn the distinction.346 
 
                                                 
342
 See id. at 360. 
343
 See Brogan, supra note 320, at *7. 
344
 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992). 
345
 Id. (ellipsis in original). 
346
 Individuals and groups increasingly use expressions and exchange of ideas in mass 
and electronic media to share opinions in the way they used expressions in streets and 
parks in the past.  See Zatz, supra note 251 at 151.  The Supreme Court, however, has 
given little heed to such concerns in the traditional public forum analysis.  See Lee, 505 
U.S. at 696-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court for focusing on historical 
pedigree and concluding “open, public spaces and thoroughfares that are suitable for 
discourse may be public forums, whatever their historical pedigree and without concern 
for a precise classification of the property.”).  
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[117] The physical characteristics of the blog alone, however, are not 
dispositive of the traditional public forum analysis.347  One must also 
consider its location and purpose.348  While the legislator’s blog is hosted 
on a government server and is within a government Internet domain, it is 
set apart as individual space attributed to the particular legislator.349  The 
blog is not like a park where one can loiter and spread his or her 
message.350  Instead, the blog is like a bulletin board where one can leave 
a message and hope it gains attention.351  This indicates that a blog and 
probably the entire Internet cannot be considered traditional public fora – 
even if the category were still open to new types of properties – because 
their uses are not consistent with those attributed to traditional public 
fora.352 
 
[118] Since that door seems closed, the inquiry must proceed to the other 
categories.  One commentator has offered a test for determining when a 
site on the Internet is a designated public forum.353  According to 
Goldstone, the site fits this category if it is government owned or 
                                                 
347
 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990). 
348
 Id. at 728-29. 
349
 See Hotel Emples. & Rest. Emples. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Parks & Rec., 311 F.3d 534, 550 
(2002) (Lincoln Center is separate from nearby public forum property; accessibility to 
local streets is incidental to its design). 
350
 Navigation in cyberspace is different from navigating the offline world in a way that is 
significant for speech.  In the offline world, locations are separated by the distance 
between them with intervening properties giving each location context.  Thus, a 
government property physically separated from a public forum property with 
characteristics not amenable to speech may be a non-public forum.  See Kokinda, 497 
U.S. at 727 (holding sidewalk to Post Office entrance non-public forum though municipal 
sidewalk located across the parking lot was public forum).  Because the “distance” 
between two locations on the Internet is simply a different Uniform Resource Locator, 
cyberspace eliminates the distance between any two locations and the corresponding time 
of travel.  Similarly, links on one site may lead directly to another site of which the user 
was not aware – making the two sites “close” in the sense that the user need not search 
for the second site.  “Cyberspace, by contrast [to the offline world], disaggregates internal 
features of the place from its spatial characteristics.”  See Zatz, supra note 251, at 183-87. 
351
 See Hotel Emples., 311 F. 3d at 551-52 (though design of the Lincoln Center plaza 
allowed pedestrians to pass through, restrictions on expression indicated the 
government’s purpose was to conserve it as an extension of the performing arts complex). 
352
 Reno notably did not apply a public forum analysis.  Such analysis would not have 
aided the Court’s analysis because history and tradition would not require protecting 
speech in such a new forum.  See Brogan, supra note 320, at *58. 
353
 See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 368-69. 
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controlled, offers unlimited access to recipients of information, and gives 
viewpoint-neutral access to a large number of information senders.354  The 
legislator in our hypothetical opened the blog in her governmental 
capacity, ostensibly for the purpose of allowing any and all of her 
constituents to visit the blog and contribute their opinions.  This seems to 
satisfy Goldstone’s sensible designated public forum test.  To classify the 
blog as such, however, would provide too much speech protection. 
 
[119] To maintain the efficiency necessary to make this method of 
soliciting constituent opinions useful, the legislator would need to place 
some limits on blog postings.  If the legislator was primarily concerned 
with how she should vote on a pending immigration bill, wading through 
thousands of comments, for example, about whether to seek funds to 
repair a road in Kentucky would undermine the blog’s usefulness to her.  
The blog, therefore, should be classified as a limited public forum.355  So 
long as they addressed their speech to one of the political topics posed or 
permitted for discussion by the legislator,356 speakers in the forum would 
be entitled to First Amendment protection.357 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
354
 Id. 
355
 The forum should be considered a limited public forum instead of a broader 
designated public forum because the legislator, as controller of the forum, can choose the 
topics for discussion.  See Hotel Emples., 311 F.3d at 545 (government may choose the 
speakers and/or subjects permitted in a limited public forum).   
356
 The legislator could prohibit any speech dealing with other issues with an appropriate 
time, place, or manner regulation.  See supra note 239.  Professor Brogan argues time, 
place, or manner regulations are appropriate in parks where they maximize speech by 
preventing simultaneous conflicting uses but are unnecessary in the online world where 
multiple users can use the same space at the same time. See Brogan, supra note 320, at 
*7.  His analysis, though generally correct, does not recognize the particular efficiency 
concerns needed to make the speech useful and to prevent some posters from overtaking 
the blog in the present context. 
357
 See cf. U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 137 
(1981) (“Only where the exercise of First Amendment rights is incompatible with the 
normal activity occurring on public property have we held the property is not a public 
forum.”) 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue 4 
 
50 
2. WHY CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF THE BLOG SHOULD CONCERN 
THE LEGISLATOR 
 
[120] A legislator advised that constitutional speech protection will attach 
to postings on his blog would ask himself whether he was willing to open 
a protected forum for constituents.  A legislator whose immediate concern 
is an immigration bill should immediately recognize that some 
constituents would post messages with incendiary and derogatory 
language for all the world to see.  The politician would want a moderator 
to prevent dissemination of such “harmful” messages.358  This desire to 
limit speech conflicts with constitutional protections for speakers in the 
forum.359 
 
[121] The constitutional safeguards for speech would prohibit the 
legislator from controlling speech on the blog.  Our society values a 
diversity of opinions, even those most people find odious, to build a 
stronger culture.360  Thus, the government is not permitted to censor the 
content of speech.361  Accordingly, the government may neither exclude 
participants from a forum because of the content of their speech362 nor 
delete a viewpoint from a discussion in the forum without violating the 
First Amendment.363 
 
                                                 
358
 See DAVIS, supra note 96 at 115. 
359
 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (once the government 
voluntarily opens a forum, the government is subject to applicable constitutional 
standards for any attempts to exclude speakers). 
360
 “[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It 
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates 
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often 
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have 
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of 
speech . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment. . . .”  Terminiello 
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
361
 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (“To permit the 
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each 
individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from 
government censorship.  The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control.”). 
362
 City of Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employ. Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 179 
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
363
 See Goldstone, supra note 9, at 396. 
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[122] The easiest case for application of the First Amendment involves 
comments critical of the legislator’s performance.  While the legislator 
might want to censor such comments, he cannot do so.  Such criticism is 
the essence of our political culture.  The government may not exclude 
from a forum critical comments addressed to the government acting in its 
governmental capacity.364 
 
[123] The criticism example is easy because politicians are expected to 
endure public criticism.  The harder case involves the desire to censor 
speech that is likely to offend some of the legislator’s constituents.  
Regardless of the legislator’s purportedly altruistic motive for desiring to 
censor such speech, the First Amendment will not permit him to do so. 
 
[124] Government may not permit some speech but deny other speech of 
the same nature because the subject of the latter speech is more likely to 
produce unpleasant effects.365  Such discrimination based on the content of 
the speech is impermissible under the First Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.366  The legislator could 
have allowed limited discourse on her blog without opening a public 
forum.367  Once she has invited citizen comments on political issues, 
however, she cannot constitutionally limit the forum to those with whom 
she agrees.368   
 
[125] The legislator, therefore, will be hard pressed to claim a right to 
limit or prohibit speech or speakers with whose views she takes issue.369  
Our firm constitutional protections for the content of speech virtually 
                                                 
364
 See id. 
365
 See, e.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100 (stating that picketing only regarding labor disputes 
is not allowed); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 
(1969) (banning the wearing of arm bands only when done as a silent protest of Vietnam 
war is not allowed). 
366
 See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100. 
367
 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (stating the government does 
not open a public forum by permitting only limited discourse on its property). 
368
 See Mosley, 400 U.S. at 96 (“Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be 
based on content alone . . . .”); see also City of Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment 
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (“[w]here the State has opened a forum for 
direct citizen involvement,” it cannot exclude a group of citizens from participating). 
369
 See Goldstone, supra note 323, at 30-31. 
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eliminate any ability for the legislator to censor or remove postings.370  No 
claimed need to limit the forum will protect the legislator because the 
reasonableness of a regulation is irrelevant when the government 
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint or content.371 
 
[126] The desperate legislator, however, might claim she has a duty to 
protect her constituents.  Some posters, she will correctly point out, state 
their messages in ways highly likely to offend others.  The legislator will 
claim she must screen messages to ensure they are appropriate for the bulk 
of her constituents and remove those that are likely to offend or inflame.  
This assertion, however, also fails. 
 
[127] The government may not restrict or punish protected speech in a 
public forum because some of the words are unpleasant.372  Similarly, the 
government cannot regulate speech simply because it proves embarrassing 
to some who hear or see it.373  A restriction on speech is not content 
neutral when it is based on another’s reaction to the speech.374  As such, 
the fact many might consider the posting or part of it vulgar, crass, or 
personally offensive does not deprive the posting of First Amendment 
                                                 
370
 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) 
(“It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive 
content or the message it conveys.”); see generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 
(1997) (stating that content-based regulations raise special First Amendment concerns 
because of the chilling effect they have on speech).  The discussion of “censoring” 
speech, while generally addressed to removal or alteration of posted material, would also 
extend to prohibiting speech from being posted at all.  Such censorship is unconstitutional 
whether done manually or through computer software screening out certain words or 
phrases.  The First Amendment does not permit prior restraints prohibiting speech merely 
because the government objects to the planned message.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
371
 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (viewpoint); 
see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 879 (content). 
372
 See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590 (1969) (involving the public burning 
of the flag while shouting:  “We don’t need no damn flag . . . . [I]f they let that happen to 
[civil rights activist James] Meredith, we don’t need an American flag.”); Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 17 (1971) (involving the wearing of a jacket with the words 
“Fuck the draft” on back in courthouse). 
373
 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (involving a parody ad 
suggesting minister lost his virginity to his mother in a fly-infested outhouse)). 
374
 See id. at 754-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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protection.375  In public fora, individuals are expected to avoid or ignore 
speech they do not want to hear or see.376  The legislator, therefore, cannot 
censor comments on her blog.   
 
3. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR COMPUTER SERVICE PROVIDERS 
UNDERMINE ANY CLAIMED NEED FOR THE LEGISLATOR TO CENSOR HER 
BLOG 
 
[128] The legislator may assert, though, that the worldwide visibility of 
blog postings makes removal or alteration of postings appropriate to 
protect her against potential legal liability for assertions made on the blog.  
When applying such a content-based restriction on speech, the legislator 
must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard by demonstrating her action is 
necessary to serve a compelling interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end.377  Because of the statutory protection afforded to computer 
service providers, the legislator cannot meet this test. 
 
[129] Congress has recognized the Internet as “a forum for a true diversity 
of political discourse….”378  In order to protect the forum, in the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”),379 “Congress granted most 
Internet services immunity from liability for publishing false or 
defamatory material so long as the information was provided by another 
party.”380  In the CDA, Congress provided:  “No provider or user of an 
                                                 
375
 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25 (“[I]t is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity 
is another’s lyric.”); see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (“Indeed, [the Supreme Court has 
previously] admonished that ‘the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a 
sufficient reason for suppressing it.’”) (citations omitted). 
376
 See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 749 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Of course, the Supreme Court 
has held certain language cannot be broadcast over the airwaves during times when 
children were likely to be listening.  See FCC v. Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 
(1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978) (George Carlin’s “seven words you can never 
say on television” routine).  The Court, however, based its ruling on the fact the airwaves 
are “invasive,” in that one could unintentionally encounter the profanity by just scanning 
radio stations.  Id.  No such concerns exist in the present context.  The Internet user must 
have the URL for the legislator’s blog and intentionally choose to visit the site. 
377
 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.  263, 269-70 (1981). 
378
 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (1998). 
379
 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006). 
380
 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”381 
 
[130] An “interactive computer service,” the service one must provide or 
use in order to receive the CDA’s protection, is defined as “any 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet . . . 
.”
382
  An “information content provider” is “any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of 
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.”383 
 
[131] Courts have not yet addressed the applicability of § 230 to blogs.  
The statute, though, likely protects bloggers.  By setting up an electronic 
location where multiple users may converge, a blogger becomes a 
“provider of an interactive computer service.”384  Such postings on a blog 
appear to constitute information provided by a third party for which the 
blogger is immune.385   
 
[132] As such, § 230(c) gives the legislator-blogger full immunity so long 
as a third party voluntarily provides “the essential published content.”386  
The legislator, by controlling the topics for discussion, does not become a 
content provider and thereby lose the benefit of statutory protection.  Such 
a claim was rejected in Carafano v. Matchmaker.com, Inc.  Carafano 
claimed Matchmaker.com, a dating website, was an information content 
provider because it created a survey, including the possible responses to 
multiple choice questions, an individual completed to post a profile falsely 
using Carafano’s identity.  The court, however, ruled Matchmaker.com 
                                                 
381
 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998). 
382
 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(f)(2) (LexisNexis 2002). 
383
 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(f)(3) (LexisNexis 2002). 
384
 See Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 718 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (one who 
provides a website that other computer users can access is a “provider or user of an 
interactive computer service”).  Similarly, where a website is hosted by a commercial 
Internet service provider, the site creator is a “user.”  See id. (citing Ben Ezra, Weinstein, 
& Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
385
 See Peterson, supra note 175, at 44. 
386
 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124. 
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did not provide any content because the third party, not the website, made 
the selections and wrote the essays that constituted the profile.  As such, 
Matchmaker.com was not an information content provider and, therefore, 
was immune from liability under § 230(c).387 
 
[133] Section 230 immunity from liability destroys the legislator’s claimed 
compelling interest in censoring postings on his blog.  Because the 
legislator will not face liability for the content of the postings, he has no 
reason acceptable under modern First Amendment jurisprudence for 
exercising censorship.  The politician seeking to use the Internet to reach 
out to constituents simply has no concerns to balance against citizens’ 
speech rights.388   
 
[134] To the contrary, a legislator who attempts to censor or alter postings 
may face legal liability.  The Ninth Circuit has held that:   
 
[A] service provider or user is immune from liability under 
§ 230(c)(1) when a third person or entity that created or 
developed the information in question furnished it to the 
provider or user under circumstances in which a reasonable 
person in the position of the service provider or user would 
conclude that the information was provided for publication 
on the Internet or other “interactive computer service.”389 
 
This suggests bloggers who edit third-party postings become speakers and, 
at least in some courts, lose their protection against liability.390 
 
[135] Still, the legislator might point to courts that reached a contrary 
conclusion, holding a service provider could edit messages without losing 
his immunity.  Because § 230 protects against liability for editorial 
                                                 
387
 Id.; see also Gentry v. Ebay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 703, 717-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
(online auction site immune where it simply compiled ratings information provided by 
customers). 
388
 Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278 (1989) (noting university has right to make 
academic judgments on how to allocate scarce resources). 
389
 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003). 
390
 See Peterson, supra note 175, at 45-46; see also Optinrealbig.com, LLC v. Ironport 
Sys., Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 1037, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
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functions related to the traditional role of a publisher,391 the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that one who makes only “minor alterations” to a posting did not 
“develop” the content so as to become the “information content 
provider.”392  According to the Ninth Circuit, the issue for immunity 
purposes is one of degree in altering the material.393 A New Jersey state 
court went so far as to ignore any consideration of degree in affording 
immunity.  That court held the operator of a bulletin board system immune 
under § 230 even though he edited a message to remove profanity and 
shaped the content of other messages.394 
 
[136] Whatever merit those approaches might have when dealing with the 
private sector, they cannot allow the legislator as government agent to 
censor messages.395  Congress intended § 230 to reflect its desire to 
protect computer service providers from tort liability in order to avoid the 
chilling effect such liability would have on speech.  Thus, Congress 
intended § 230 to permit more speech on the Internet with minimal 
government interference consistent with the goals of the First Amendment 
rather than to allow service providers to limit speech.396   
 
[137] Permitting a legislator to control the content of postings would not 
serve the purposes of either § 230 or the First Amendment.  Such control 
would allow the legislator to remove speech – core political speech – from 
the marketplace of ideas.  This limitation would serve no compelling 
purpose.  As set out above, the legislator faces no liability for any of the 
content third parties posted on her blog.397   
 
                                                 
391
 See Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Zeran v. 
America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (Section 230 “precludes courts from 
entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.”). 
392
 See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031. 
393
 Id. at 1032. 
394
 See Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 719-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).  
395
 Cf. Green, 318 F.3d at 472 (rejecting First Amendment challenge to § 230 because 
America Online is a private company with no First Amendment obligations). 
396
 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31; see also Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027-28. 
397
 Significantly, § 230 still allows the government to punish the provider of offending 
material.  See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.  Thus, while the legislator would be immune from 
liability for a defamatory posting, the actual poster could be held liable. 
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[138] Further, no other legitimate, much less compelling, reason exists for 
censoring the postings. When the politician creates an open forum where 
constituents can come, go, and speak as they please, readers are unlikely 
to view comments posted on the blog as being those of or reflecting the 
opinions of the legislator.398  Instead, viewers of expression made up of 
many individual parts generally understand that each component of the 
whole offers its own perspective on the overall theme.399  Moreover, one 
might question whether any harm results from negative postings on a blog.  
Blogs are fora for opinion whose typical messages – often filled with poor 
grammar and spelling and often vulgar and offensive content – lack the 
indicia of facts or reliability on which reasonable persons rely when 
evaluating information sources.400 
 
[139] Finally, and most importantly, no need exists for censorship in the 
blog context.  The Internet allows any politician or other viewer who 
wishes to distance himself or herself from another’s posting to respond 
instantly in the same forum and to the same audience.  Rather than 
needing to censor potentially unpopular views, a politician and any readers 
of his blog have the ability to “set the record straight” by declaring his or 
her position on statements made in constituent postings.401   
 
[140] The legislator simply cannot demonstrate a compelling interest in 
censoring constituent postings on her blog.  The postings are unlikely to 
be attributed to the legislator and, even if they were, she would be immune 
from liability for their content.  Further, she has the option of responding 
directly to the viewing audience, allowing the legislator to protect her 
reputation by disavowing unwanted speech.402  As such, once the 
                                                 
398
 See Goldstone, supra note 323, at 32. 
399
 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 577 (1995) (“Without deciding on the precise significance of the likelihood of 
misattribution, it nonetheless becomes clear that in the context of an expressive parade, as 
with a protest march, the parade’s overall message is distilled from the individual 
presentations along the way, and each unit’s expression is perceived by spectators as part 
of the whole.”) 
400
 See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 465-66 (Del. 2005) (collecting cases). 
401
 Id. at 464 (noting one allegedly defamed by blog postings has powerful remedy in 
ability to respond to defamatory comments). 
402
 Significantly, even if the blog were held to be a non-public forum such that a speech 
restriction must only be reasonable, the legislator probably still could not censor postings.  
Posting on a blog is much like leafletting in a public place, as one simply leaves a 
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legislator opens the forum for political discussion, the First Amendment 
will prohibit her from exercising any control over the content of postings 
addressed to the topics she raises or permits for discussion. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
[141] The Internet has become a powerful tool for spreading messages 
around town and around the world.  Blogs have made it possible for this 
communication to be truly interactive, letting people express their 
opinions on issues raised by someone else in the same forum where the 
issue was initially presented.  This has created a revolution in how 
information is disseminated, already challenging the established media.  
The revolution is not, however, likely to alter our political processes. 
 
[142] Blogs could make direct communication between legislator and 
constituent simple and efficient.  A legislator could ask constituents 
whether he should, for example, support spending tax dollars to construct 
a fence along the border with Mexico to keep out illegal immigrants.  This 
has facial appeal.  Many citizens would perceive the legislator who 
allowed such interaction as truly concerned about the desires of the 
People.  Still, the large downside probably will keep any legislator from 
setting up such a blog. 
 
[143] At a theoretical level, engaging in such direct communication may 
be objectionable because it is subject to some of the same concerns that 
led the Framers to avoid direct democracy.  The legislator who solicits 
opinions might feel he or she has to abide by the wishes of the majority.  
By doing so, the legislator would facilitate the tyranny of the majority the 
Framers sought to avoid. 
 
[144] Most important for present purposes are the First Amendment 
implications of setting up the blog.  Though it exists only in a digital 
                                                                                                                         
message for others to see and hopes it draws attention.  Even in a non-public forum, a ban 
on distributing leaflets may be unreasonable and invalid.  See Int’l Society for Krishna 
Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 689-90 (1992) (ban on leaflets not reasonably 
related to preserving mall-like atmosphere of airport terminal).  Further, government 
regulation of speech simply because some members of the public might disagree with it is 
invalid even in non-public fora.  See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 760 n.13 
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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realm, the blog still would be treated under the typical public forum 
analysis.  This would result in classifying the blog as a limited public 
forum at which the legislator’s constituents could post their feelings 
regarding the topics posed by the legislator – no matter how offensive, 
virulent, or crass – for all the world to see.  Because the postings are 
political speech, they would be protected by the First Amendment. 
 
[145] The legislator, because of the First Amendment protection, would be 
unable to remove or alter the offensive postings.  He could not 
demonstrate any compelling need to remove the postings, particularly 
since he is protected by the Communications Decency Act from any 
liability for statements posted on his blog.  The First Amendment would 
require the legislator to permit all postings relevant to topics permitted for 
discussion on the blog to remain visible to the entire world. 
 
[146] This loss of control over their messages will cause politicians to 
avoid blogging with constituents.  Only the rarest politician would be 
willing to become associated with comments some will view as offensive 
or incendiary.  In this context, application of First Amendment principles 
will have the perverse effect of reducing speech permitted in the 
marketplace.  Whatever the potential of blogs, then, their impact is 
unlikely to alter the relationship between legislator and constituent. 
